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PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE IN A 905(b) ACTION
AFTER SCINDIA-FOR THE PLAINTIFF
Ross Diamond, III*
The 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act' were intended to place some limitations
on the liability of shipowners for injuries occurring during loading
or unloading operations. To effect this goal, the amendments took from
longshoremen and harbor workers the right to recover for unseaworthiness, but explicitly reserved their right to sue the vessel for
negligence in 33 U.S.C. S 905(b). However, the amendments did not
fully define the scope of the statutory negligence action; the courts
were left to determine the precise limits of the action by establishing
the range of shipowner duties upon which it could be based.
In applying the amendments, however, the circuit courts split between two different interpretations.2 The Second, Fourth, and Fifth
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Member, Alabama State Bar; Secretary of Admiralty Section, Association of
Trial Lawyer's of America.
1. 33 U.S.C. SS901-952 (1976). Section 905(b) provides as follows:
(b) In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused
by the negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action against
such vessel as a third party in accordance with the provisions of section
933 of this title, and the employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such
damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the contrary shall be void. If such person was employed by the vessel to provide
stevedoring services, no such action shall be permitted if the injury was caused
by the negligence of persons engaged in providing stevedoring services to
the vessel. If such person was employed by the vessel to provide ship building
or repair services, no such action shall be permitted if the injury was caused
by the negligence of persons engaged in providing ship building or repair
services to the vessel. The liability of the vessel under this subsection shall
not be based upon the warranty of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at
the time the injury occurred. The remedy provided in this subsection shall
be exclusive of all other remedies against the vessel except remedies available
under this chapter.
2. While most of the circuits lined up behind one of the two interpretations discussed in the text, the Third Circuit adopted yet another view of the shipowner's
duties under the amendments. See Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 610
F.2d 116 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated sub nom. American Commercial Lines v. Griffith, 451
U.S. 965 (1981); Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237 (3d Cir. 1977). The Third
Circuit was unwilling to impose upon shipowners an unqualified duty to exercise
"reasonable care under the circumstances." At the same time, the court refused to
accept the proposition that a shipowner's duties under section 905(b) should be defined in all cases by reference to sections 343 and 343A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts. The Third Circuit suggested that section 905(b) should be interpreted as
imposing on the shipowner a standard of "reasonable care under the circumstances,"
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Circuits defined the range of shipowner's duties-and therefore the
reach of section 905(b)-in terms of a landowner's duty to invitees
as stated in sections 343 and 343A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.' The First, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits rejected the land-based
definition and adopted a test of "reasonable care under the circumstances" as the measure of shipowner duties under section 905(b).'
With this backdrop, the United States Supreme Court finally addressed the question of what duties were owed by the shipowner
under section 905 of the Act. In Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De
Los Santos,5 the Court refused to adopt either of the definitions of
the shipowner's duties employed by the circuit courts. The Supreme
Court instead established a middle ground, interpreting the duties
imposed on shipowners by section 905(b) more expansively than the
land-based definition adopted by the Fifth Circuit but less expansively
than the "reasonable care under the circumstances" definition adopted
by the Ninth Circuit.
THE SCINDIA DECISION

The Scindia decision should first be analyzed in light of the facts
of that case. There was evidence in Scindia that the ship's winch had
been malfunctioning during stevedoring operations for two days prior
to the accident. Further evidence indicated that the malfunction may
have at least contributed to the injury sustained by the plaintiff.' The
Court stated that a question remained as to whether the shipowner
had actual knowledge of the failure of the winch's braking mechanism,
but not the same general standard of "reasonable care under the circumstances" adopted
by the other circuits. The Third Circuit asserted that "reasonable care under the circumstances" should be defined in terms of land-based negligence principles such as
those found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, where those principles were not
inconsistent with the purposes of section 905(b). The Third Circuit went on to suggest, however, that reference to sections 343 and 343A of the Restatement, which
define the landowner's liability to persons on his land, was not always appropriate.
The Third Circuit felt that the duties of a shipowner to longshoremen under section
905(b) could more properly be defined by reference to those sections of the Restatement addressing a landowner's liability to the employees of an independent contractor. See Hurst, 554 F.2d 1237 (3d Cir. 1977).
3. Gay v. Ocean Transp. & Trading, 546 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1977); Anuszewski
v. Dynamic Mariners Corp., Panama, 540 F.2d 757 (4th Cir. 1976); Napoli v. Hellenic
Lines, 536 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1976).
4. Santos v. Scindia Steam Nay. Co., 598 F.2d 480, 486 (9th Cir. 1979); see also
Johnson v. A/S Ivarans Rederi, 613 F.2d 334, 348 (1st Cir. 1980); cf. Matthews v. Ernst
Russ S.S. Co., 603 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1979).
5. 451 U.S. 156 (1981).
6. Id. at 159-60.
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although the plaintiff apparently conceded that no one from the ship's
crew was ever informed of the condition of the winch. The Court also
found that a question remained as to whether the winch was defective before the beginning of stevedoring operations, so as to charge
the shipowner with knowledge of the condition.7 There apparently was
no evidence in the record indicating that Scindia retained any control
over that part of the vessel during the loading operation.' Faced with
this situation, the Court recognized that the shipowner's duties to
longshoremen working on board the vessel fall into at least three
distinguishable "categories."9
The first of these categories relates to conditions existing on the
vessel at the beginning of stevedoring operations. Citing its decision
in Federal Marine Terminals v. Burnside Shipping Co. 0 with approval,
the Court again asserted that the shipowner has a duty to exercise
reasonable care under the circumstances to have the ship and its equipment in such condition that a stevedoring company will be able, by
the exercise of reasonable care, to carry on its operations with
reasonable safety to persons and property. The shipowner also has
a duty to warn the stevedore of hazards on the ship or with respect
to the condition of its equipment that are known to him or should
be known to him in the exercise of reasonable care and which would
not be obvious to or anticipated by the stevedore.11
The second category of shipowner duties relates to the situation
in which the shipowner remains actively involved in or retains control of the cargo operations. In this context, the shipowner has the
duty to avoid negligently injuring longshoremen and he has a further
duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid exposing longshoremen to
harm from hazards encountered in areas or from equipment under
the active control of the vessel. 2
The final "category" of shipowner duties attempts to define the
owner's responsibility with respect to conditions which develop dur7. Id. at 178.
8. Id. at 161-62.
9. In Duplantis v. Zigler Shipyards, 692 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1982), the Fifth Circuit interpreted Scindia in a similar manner. The Fifth Circuit indicated that Scindia
had recognized the existence of separate, distinct duties owed by shipowners to the
employees of stevedores, and went on to discuss the "three principles" enunciated
in Scindia that govern these duties. Id. at 374. The Fifth Circuit also held that the
same duties owed by shipowners to stevedores and their employees under Scindia
were also owed by shipowners to independent contractors and their employees.
10. 394 U.S. 404 (1969).
11. 451 U.S. at 167.
12. Id.
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ing stevedoring operations over which the shipowner has retained no
control. Under these circumstances, the shipowner has no general duty
to supervise the work of the stevedoring employees or to prevent
development of dangerous conditions within the area of the cargo
operation under the exclusive control of the stevedore, "absent contract provision, positive law or custom to the contrary."" However,
if the shipowner has knowledge of a dangerous condition and of an
obviously improvident failure of the stevedore to take corrective action, the shipowner has a duty to intervene and either stop the operation or repair the defect.
From the plaintiff's viewpoint, it is felt that the concurring opinion of Justice Brennan accurately summarizes the duties which should
be imposed on the shipowner:
My views are that under the 1972 Amendments: (1) a
shipowner has a general duty to exercise reasonable care
under the circumstances; (2) in exercising reasonable care, the
shipowner must take reasonable steps to determine whether
the ship's equipment is safe before turning that equipment
over to the stevedore; (3) the shipowner has a duty to inspect
the equipment turned over to the stevedore or to supervise
the stevedore if a custom, contract provision, law or regulation creates either of those duties; and (4) if the shipowner
has actual knowledge that equipment in the control of the
stevedore is in an unsafe condition, and a reasonable belief
that the stevedore will not remedy that condition, the
shipowner has a duty either to halt the stevedoring operation, to make the stevedore eliminate the unsafe condition,
or to eliminate the unsafe condition itself.
Since I read the Court's opinion to be consistent with these
views, I join the Court's opinion. 4
While admittedly there could be considerable discussion as to whether
this concurring opinion says exactly what the opinion of Justice White
says,15 it is felt that the duties covered by the post-Scindia 905(b)
13. Id. at 172.
14. Id. at 179-80.
15. For example, the first duty listed by Justice Brennan, the "general duty to
exercise reasonable care under the circumstances," is not necessarily in agreement
with Justice White's opinion. If Justice Brennan is referring to a general duty on
the part of the shipowner to exercise reasonable care, before the stevedore is given
exclusive control of the equipment and operations, to place the ship and its equipment
in such condition that an experienced stevedore could carry on his cargo operations

with reasonable safety, then this statement is consistent with Justice White's opinion.
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negligence action will most likely assume the form described by Justice
Brennan.
POST-ScINDIA DECISIONS
A number of decisions have interpreted Scindia and applied the
duties discussed by the Supreme Court to various fact situations.
These cases will be considered as they relate to the three categories
of duties discussed by the court in Scindia.6
Duties with Respect to Conditions Present at the Beginning of
Stevedoring Operations
The shipowner's duties with respect to the condition of the vessel
and its equipment prior to the beginning of stevedoring operations
are clear; he has the duty to use reasonable care to see that the ship,
its equipment, and work spaces are in such condition as will permit
the stevedoring company to carry out cargo operations with reasonable
safety, and he also has the duty to warn the stevedore of any hazards
known to him or which should have been known to him and which
would not ordinarily be anticipated by the stevedore.
The Third Circuit, in Griffith v. Wheeling-PittsburghSteel Corp.,"
addressed a case in which a longshoreman was injured due to a defective hatch cover on a barge. The hatch cover in question was stuck
because of damage or improper maintenance and was in that condition when the barge was delivered. In the process of closing the cover,
the plaintiff fell into the hold through an adjacent hatch cover. After
reviewing duties articulated by the Supreme Court in Scindia, the
Third Circuit found that the vessel owner knew or should have known
of the defect prior to turning the barge over to the stevedore. The
vessel owner also had reason to believe that the stevedore might use
a method of moving the stuck hatch covers which would expose a
Id. at 166-67. However, if Justice Brennan is referring to a continuing duty on the
part of the shipowner to exercise "reasonable care under the circumstances" after the
stevedore has been given exclusive control of equipment and cargo operations, then
his statement of this first duty could be considered contrary to the views expressed
by Justice White, under some factual circumstances. Id. at 163 n.10, 168-69.
However, the stevedore is rarely given actual "exclusive" control of equipment
and cargo operations on most cargo vessels.
16. For another discussion of these duties, see Edelman, Standard of Care in
Longshoremen's Negligence Cases, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 1. 1982, at 1, col. 1.
17. 657 F.2d 25 (3d Cir. 1981). This case was on remand from the Supreme Court
to be considered further in light of the decision in Scindia. American Commercial Lines
v. Griffith, 451 U.S. 965 (1981).

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 44

longshoreman to an unreasonable risk of injury. The vessel owner took
no steps to prevent harm to the longshoreman and the court concluded
that, under such circumstances, imposition of liability was consistent
with Scindia.
The Fifth Circuit was presented with a similar case in Stass v.
American Commercial Lines," in which the plaintiff longshoreman had
been assigned with a few other longshoremen to open grain doors
and inspect the rain seals for damage. Stass and his co-worker,
unaware that the doors were inoperable, encountered trouble when
they attempted to open the third set of doors and, try as they might,
were unable to open them. While trying to lift the doors, Stass slipped
and fell backwards into an open hatch behind him. The district court
granted judgment in favor of the barge owner based upon the
land-based standard applied in the Fifth Circuit before Scindia. The
Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, stating that it was clear from
Scindia that a vessel owner is under an obligation to turn his vessel
over to the stevedore in a reasonably safe condition, and he is required to warn the stevedore of any malfunction in the ship's gear
or equipment that is either known or which should be known to the
owner. Failure to take any action with respect to the defective grain
door here was clearly a violation of these duties. 9
In Lemon v. Banks Lines,2 ' the Fifth Circuit extended the vessel
owner's duty in this regard to potentially dangerous conditions existing in previously stowed cargo. In Lemon, rolls of burlap had been
loaded into the hold of the ship in a manner which created gaps between the rolls and the skin of the ship. Bales of jute had been dumped
in as "filler cargo" in the overhead spaces as well as in the spaces
that had developed along the sides of the hold. A longshoreman was
in the hold unloading when he noticed that one of the stacks of jute
seemed unstable. In an attempt to rectify the situation, the
longshoreman was seriously injured.
At the district court level, a jury found that the defendant
shipowner was negligent in the method and manner of stowing the
cargo and that this negligence proximately contributed to the plaintiff's injury. The district court granted judgment notwithstanding the
verdict in favor of the shipowner. The testimony showed that the chief
mate had actual knowledge of the improper loading technique and

18. 683 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1981).
19. Accord Wild v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Corp., 665 F.2d 519 (5th Cir. 1981) (defective
condition of a ladder existed before the commencement of work by the repair crew).
20. 656 F.2d 110, 116-17 (5th Cir. 1981).

19831

905 (b) ACTIONS AFTER SCINDIA

failed to take action to either correct the stowage or to warn the
plaintiff of the dangerous conditions. The Fifth Circuit held that, in
light of the Scindia decision, the district court erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
In a similar case, Clay v. Lykes Brothers Steamship Co.,21 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held the
shipowner responsible for injury to a longshoreman attributable to
the improper stowage of cargo. In this case, a lash barge had been
improperly loaded in London. Two cargo containers had been loaded
onto the barge and lashed along their bottoms by cable. Bundles of
steel tubing were then loaded upon the deck of the barge and on top
of the cable in such a manner as to completely hide the cable. When
the off-loading stevedores began to raise the containers from the barge,
the cable was placed under tension and broke, causing injury to the
longshoreman. The district *court held that the vessel owner had no
duty to supervise the on-loading stevedores, but that the owner did
have a duty to examine the completed assignment and to warn the
unloading stevedore of any dangerous conditions created by the loading
stevedore. The court therefore found that Lykes should have been
aware of the dangerous cable and that it breached its duty by failing
to warn the plaintiff of the dangerous condition existing from the
beginning of the operation.
The Ninth Circuit has also imposed liability on shipowners in connection with injuries caused by improper stowage of cargo. In Turner
v. JapanLines,2 a longshoreman was injured while unloading a cargo
of plywood when a stack of the plywood collapsed beneath him. There
was evidence that the plywood had been stowed improperly by a
Japanese stevedore and that the improper stowage was due to a lack
of proper shoring of the stacked plywood. The evidence further showed
that the stowage of the cargo was unreasonably dangerous to the offloading longshoremen, and that the defect could not have been
discovered by them.
Expert testimony in the Turner case established that the master
or one of his mates is responsible for overseeing the loading operations and particularly for insuring that the cargo is properly shored.
The Ninth Circuit therefore found that the shipowner should have
known of the condition of the stow and should have warned the
stevedore of the dangerous condition. The court also found that the
shipowner's failure to warn of this condition negligently caused the
21.
22.

525 F. Supp. 306 (E.D. La. 1981).
651 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1981).
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plaintiff's injuries. It is interesting to note, as did the Ninth Circuit,
that section 905(b) did not prevent the shipowner from bringing an
indemnity action against the foreign stevedore, since it was not the
plaintiffs employer."
One of the more recent cases addressing the shipowner's duty
with respect to pre-existing conditions is Subingsubing v. Reardon
Smith Line, Ltd." The accident in the Subingsubing case occurred when
the longshoreman slipped on a "dead-eye" that had been left on the
deck. This dead-eye came from a ladder used by the vessel's crew
before the longshoremen came on board. The Ninth Circuit, citing Scindia, observed that a shipowner's duties extend at least to exercising
ordinary care to have the ship and its equipment in such a condition
that expert and experienced stevedores could carry on a cargo operation with reasonable safety. The court also noted that the Senate Committee Report on the 1972 amendments had referred to the example
of a slip and fall caused by an oil spill in illustrating the standard
of care imposed on vessels.25 Emphasizing the similarity between the
facts of the instant case and those in the example given by the Senate
Committee-the only difference being the cause of the hazard-the
court held that the shipowner's duty "should at least include
reasonable care to keep the deck clear of dangerous and non-obvious
tripping hazards at the time that the longshoreworker comes on
board.""6
Landsem v. Isuzu Motors27 is a good example of how such a case
is lost by the plaintiff. The plaintiff in Landsem had slipped in oil
on the vessel's deck; he contended that the oil was present before
cargo operations began and that the situation should have been
discovered and corrected by the vessel. However, the plaintiff failed
to present any evidence that the oil was present when cargo operations began, that the shipowner had notice or knowledge of the oil,
23. Id. at 1304.
24. 682 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1982).
25. So, for example, where a longshoreman slips on an oil spill on a vessel's
deck and is injured, the proposed amendments to Section 5 would still permit an action against the vessel for negligence. To recover he must establish
that: 1) the vessel put the foreign substance on the deck, or knew that it
was there, and willfully of [sic] negligently failed to remove it; or 2) the foreign
substance had been on the deck for such a period of time that it should have
been discovered and removed by the vessel in the exercise of reasonable
care by the vessel under the circumstances. The vessel will not be chargeable
with the negligence of the stevedore or employees of the stevedore.
S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1972).
26. 682 F.2d at 782.
27. 534 F. Supp. 448 (W.D. Or. 1982).

1983]

905 (b) ACTIONS AFTER SCINDIA

or that the oil could have been discovered in the exercise of reasonable
care. The district court granted summary judgment for the shipowner
on the ground that the plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to support
a finding that the shipowner breached any duty imposed on him by
law. The lesson for plaintiff's counsel should be obvious.
Duties Imposed when the Shipowner Retains Control over or Actively
Participatesin Cargo Operations
In Scindia, the Supreme Court stated that, absent contractual provisions, positive law, or custom to the contrary, the shipowner has
no general duty to supervise or inspect for dangerous conditions that
develop during the cargo operations. However, the Court also stated:
[T~he vessel may be liable if it actively involves itself in the
cargo operations and negligently injures a longshoreman or
if it fails to exercise due care to avoid exposing longshoremen
to harm from hazards they may encounter in areas or from
equipment under the active control of the vessel during the
stevedoring operation.2 8
It is submitted that, because of the practicalities of ship-board activities during cargo operations, the majority of the post-Scindia decisions ought to fall into this category.' There are numerous situations
28. 451 U.S. at 167.
29. In fact, a number of post-Scindia cases decided by the courts on the basis
of a shipowner's continuing duty with respect to areas committed to the stevedore's
exclusive control have actually involved negligence on the part of the vessel owner
while he was participating in or sharing control of the cargo operations. One such
case is Rother v. Interstate Ocean Transp. Co., 540 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Pa. 1982). In
Rother, a tug had maneuvered an oil barge to an unloading dock for discharge of its
cargo; the injury occurred as the plaintiff was attempting to move a discharge line
across the top of a railing. The court held the vessel negligent because of the failure
of the captain to intervene and correct what the court found to be an obviously improvident method of discharge that created an unreasonable risk of harm to the dock
worker. Id. at 483. However, the unsafe condition itself had been created by the
negligence of the captain in failing to correctly position the barge for unloading.
Similarly, in Bush v. Sumitomo Bank & Trust Co., 513 F. Supp. 1051 (E.D. Tex. 1981),
the court held the vessel liable for its failure to stop the improvident conduct of the
stevedore in continuing to use a malfunctioning winch which created an unreasonable
risk of harm to the longshoremen. Again, however, liability could more properly have
been based upon the negligence of the ship's crew in an incomplete attempt to repair
the winch before the accident. Melanson v. Caribou Reefers, Ltd., 667 F.2d 213 (1st
Cir. 1981), provides a final example of this. In Melanson, a longshoreman suffered a
heart attack while attempting to lift two fifty pound cartons which had frozen together.
The stevedore had allowed the longshoremen to continue unloading the cartons after
it had been discovered that some of them were frozen together. The shipowner was
chargeable with the knowledge of the condition; the longshoremen had requested the
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in which the shipowner will have a duty to use reasonable care to
prevent or eliminate dangerous conditions which develop during cargo
operations, either because of the involvement of the vessel crew or
because of the presence of contractual provisions, positive law, or
custom.
Fortunately for longshoremen, there are now available to plaintiffs' counsel a number of decisions that illustrate the situations in
which this more comprehensive duty to discover and eliminate
dangerous conditions attaches. For example, in Lieggi v. Maritime Co.
0
of the Philippines,"
as part of the unloading operation, longshoremen
were required to use a winch located on a platform above the deck.
A greased cable and several grease spots were on top of this platform . The cable was part of the ship's gear and had been used earlier
in the day by a different longshore gang who failed to put it away.
After first encountering these obstacles, the longshoreman hatch boss
located the ship's mate and they inspected the platform together. The
ship's mate agreed to have the area cleaned up, and the longshoremen
were directed to continue working. The cable and the grease spots
were never removed from the platform, however, and one of the
longshoremen later slipped on them. Because the mate had affirmatively undertaken to correct the unsafe conditions, the Second Circuit affirmed the jury's finding of negligence on the part of the
shipowner. 1
The shipowner may also incur liability when a member of the
ship's crew creates the danger to the longshoremen. In Fanetti v.
Hellenic Lines," the Second Circuit affirmed a jury's finding of liability on the part of the shipowner for a dangerous condition on the
ship's assistance and a crew member with a pry bar obliged. Id. at 214. The First
Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the shipowner, holding that the plaintiff longshoreman had not adduced sufficient evidence to create a jury issue as to
whether the shipowner had violated the continuing duty imposed by the "obviously
improvident" language of Scindia. The court asserted that even if the shipowner were
charged with knowledge of the condition, the danger was not so obvious, nor the conduct of the stevedore so improvident, as to impose a duty to intervene on the shipowner.
In point of fact, however, it seems that this case actually involved a situation in which
the ship's crew participated in the cargo discharge operation-not a situation in which
a dangerous condition developed in an area under the exclusive control of the stevedore,
or which should have been dealt with in terms of the shipowner's continuing duty
under the "obviously improvident" standard.
30. 667 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1981).
31. Id. at 329. But see Melanson v. Caribou Reefers, Ltd., 667 F.2d 213 (1st Cir.
1981), discussed supra note 29, where the vessel crew acted to assist with a problem
in cargo handling, but no negligence was found because the harm was not forseeable.
32. 678 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1982).
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decks created by the ship's crew. When the cargo operation began,
the main deck area was relatively clear. Throughout the day, however,
the ship's crew left turnbuckles and other lashing equipment on the
deck, cluttering the area through which the longshoremen had to walk
in order to get to the winch controls. While returning to the winch
stand, the plaintiff fell on the gear left by the ship's crew. The Second Circuit, affirming the district court's rejection of the jury instruction requested by the shipowner as to its liability, held that a
shipowner choosing to act as its own stevedore (as Hellenic Lines did
in this case) is not entitled to the insulation from liability which the
hiring of an independent contractor might afford.3 As a result, the
ship and shipowner were held primarily liable for the hazard created
by the ship's crew. The Second Circuit also indicated, however, that
even where an independent stevedoring contractor has been hired,
the ship would be primarily responsible for hazards created by the
ship's crew.'
In addition, the shipowner can be held to a standard of reasonable
care under the circumstances where he exercises or retains control
over any portion of the cargo operations concurrently with the
stevedore, as illustrated by Davis v. PartenreedereiM.S. Normannia3
In Davis, the plaintiff's injury was caused by improper positioning
of the gangway. Even though the stevedore superintendent had the
authority to move the gangway during unloading, expert testimony
established that the ship's officers had a continuing responsiblility,
even during the discharge of cargo, to correct the positioning of the
gangway. In effect, the plaintiff had proven the existence of a custom
which imposed on the vessel owner a duty to exercise reasonable care
to avoid harm to the longshoremen.' The jury verdict in favor of the
plaintiff was affirmed.
Of course, additional duties to longshoremen may also be placed
on the shipowner by positive law, custom, or contract provisions. For
example, in Duty v. East Coast Tender Service,7 a longshoreman was
injured when a vessel struck the platform on which he was working.
The Fourth Circuit held that the violation of a Coast Guard regulation applicable to the vessel requiring the motor vessel to have a
licensed operator was negligence per se. And, in Irizarry v. Compania
33.
34.

Id. at 428.
Id. at 427.

35.

657 F.2d 1048 (9th Cir. 1981).

36. See id. at 1052.
37. 660 F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 1981). But cf. Scindia, 451 U.S. at 177 n.25 (Coast Guard
regulations not applicable to a foreign vessel).
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Maritime Navegacion Netumar, S.A., 8 the Second Circuit relied on
the specific duties imposed on a vessel by the Joint Maritime Safety
Code of the Port of New York-prepared pursuant to the labor agreement between the International Longshoremen's Association and the
New York Shipping Association-in affirming without published opinion a jury verdict against the vessel.
Finally, in Duplantis v. Zigler Shipyards,9 a claim was made that
industry custom placed a duty on the shipowner to obtain a certificate
that the ship was free of explosive gases before workmen could be
permitted to weld. The Fifth Circuit held that a regulation requiring
the inspection of a vessel and the issuance of a certificate that the
vessel was gas-free before any welding could be performed did not
impose upon the vessel owner a non-delegable duty to secure the certificate when the shipowner had engaged a competent independent
contractor to do the work. The court then affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the shipowner, stating that the evidence did not
establish that industry custom placed this duty on the shipowner. °
The thrust of this decision in regard to duties imposed by custom
should not be lost on plaintiffs' attorneys; the plaintiff must prove
the existence of customs and practices that give rise to additional
responsibilities on the part of the shipowner. The court will not assume
the existence of such practices nor lightly impose upon shipowners
the responsibilities associated with them."1
Where the ship's crew retains control over or participates in the
cargo operation, the vessel may be liable for both its actions and its
failure to act. Furthermore, the range and scope of the shipowner's
duties are broadened and the burden of proof on the plaintiff
longshoreman reduced where the shipowner remains actively involved
in the cargo operations.42 This was illustrated in Pluyer v. Mitsui
38. 628 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir. 1980) (jury verdict affirmed without opinion), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 969 (1981). This case was noted with interest by the Supreme Court in Scindia. 451 U.S. at 177 n.25.
39. 692 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1982).
40. Id. at 375.
41. See id.; cf. Keller v. United States, 557 F. Supp. 1218, 1224-25 (D.C. N.H. 1983).
42. The burden of proof on the plaintiff longshoreman is reduced because, in the
situation in which the shipowner is actively involved in cargo operations, the
longshoreman need prove only that the shipowner was negligent in his own operations, i.e., that his failure to exercise reasonable care created a dangerous condition
that caused injury. In the situation in which the shipowner has given exclusive control of cargo operations to a stevedore and in which the shipowner is sought to be
held liable for negligence in failing to intervene in the stevedore's operations, the
plaintiff longshoreman must go a step further to prove negligence. In this situation,
the longshoreman must prove not only that the shipowner knew of the dangerous
condition and that he failed to take steps to rectify it, but also that the stevedore's
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O.S.K. Lines." In Pluyer, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a finding by the
district court that the shipowner was liable for injuries to a
longshoreman resulting from use of an unsafe ladder furnished by the
vessel to the longshoremen. The ladder lacked nonskid pads on the
bottom, and, while plaintiff was climbing down the ladder, the ladder
slipped out from under him. The court distinguished Scindia on two
grounds: (1) in Scindia the negligence was passive, the result of a
failure of the vessel to act, while in this case the negligence was active, the vessel involving itself by furnishing an unsafe ladder; and
(2) Scindia was concerned only with the shipowner's liability for
dangerous conditions developing during the cargo operations, while
this case involved a hazard that antedated or coincided with the beginning of operations." The court concluded that it was faced with a situation different from that presented in Scindia and that "[t]he policy
considerations which militate against imposing a duty on a shipowner
to constantly monitor the stevedore's work are therefore not
applicable. ' 5
One of the more recent decisions involving active negligence on
the part of the vessel owner is Chiasson v. Rogers Terminal & Shipping Corp." In Chiasson, a longshoreman was injured when a grain
loading vessel drifted away from the ship it was loading and dumped
grain on the plaintiff rather than into the hatch of the ship. Liability
was predicated upon the failure of the owner of the grain loading
vessel, who was also the plaintiffs employer, to equip the vessel with
the winches necessary to hold it in place. This case is highly significant in one respect-it permitted imposition of third-party liability
on the stevedoring employer for its negligence as a vessel owner under
section 905(b).'7

continuation of operations in spite of the dangerous condition was "obviously improvi-

dent." In other words, the shipowner can not be held liable in these circumstances
unless the longshoreman establishes that the shipowner was not entitled to rely upon
the judgment of the stevedore. This is simply a function of the much narrower duty
the shipowner has under section 905(b) after turning over the exclusive control of
cargo operations to the stevedore. The purpose of this narrower duty is simply to
effect an allocation of responsibility between the stevedore and the shipowner that
is fair and that places liability on the party in the best position to prevent the injuries to longshoremen. See Scindia, 451 U.S. at 180-81 (Powell, J., concurring).
43. 664 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1982).
44. Id. at 1246.
45. Id.
46. 679 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1982).
47. In a very recent case, Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 103 S.Ct. 2541
(1983), the Supreme Court endorsed the position of the Fifth Circuit on this, permitting the imposition of third-party liability on a stevedoring company employer (who
was also the vessel owner) for its negligence as a vessel owner under section 905(b).
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Duties Imposed in Areas "Outside the Control" of the Shipowner
The record in Scindia was apparently devoid of evidence indicating
that the shipowner had retained any control over the cargo loading
operation. In the absence of any shipowner control over cargo
operations-a situation that is probably rare in the real world of cargo
vessels-the Court refused to recognize a general, continuing duty
on the part of the shipowner to inspect or supervise the work of the
longshoremen or to prevent the development of dangerous conditions
within the stevedoring operation." The Court did indicate, however,
that even where the shipowner has relinquished all control over the
loading operations, he might still have a duty to intervene to eliminate
unreasonable risks of harm to the longshoremen in certain limited
circumstances. 9 As an example of a situation in which such a duty
might exist, the Court posited a hypothetical in which the stevedore's
decision to continue operations in the face of a dangerous condition
was "so obviously improvident" that the shipowner, if he knew of the
dangerous condition and of the stevedore's continued operations in
spite of it, should have realized that there was an unreasonable risk
of harm to the longshoremen.' Thus, it appears that two circumstances
must concur before the shipowner has a continuing duty to
longshoremen, with respect to areas in the exclusive control of the
stevedore: (1) the shipowner must have knowledge of or be aware of
the dangerous condition, and (2) the stevedore's failure to remedy the
condition must be "obviously improvident."

48. See 451 U.S. at 163 n.10, 168, 172, 180 (Powell, J., concurring).
49. See id. at 174-76, 180 (Powell, J., concurring). But cf. id. at 179 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (the fourth duty listed by Brennan).
50. See id. at 175, 180 (Powell, J., concurring). It is important to note that Justice
White's plurality opinion did not decide that the shipowner did have a duty to intervene and eliminate the dangerous condition under the circumstances presented in
Scindia (though Justice Powell's concurrence assumes that it did). Justice White only
raises the question of whether such a duty on the part of the shipowner exists in
the described circumstances:
If Scindia was aware that the winch was malfunctioning to some degree,
and if there was a jury issue as to whether it was so unsafe that the stevedore
should have ceased using it, could the jury also have found that the winch
was so clearly unsafe that Scindia should have intervened and stopped the
loading operation until the winch was serviceable?
We raise these questions but do not answer them, since they are for the
trial court in the first instance and since neither the trial nor appellate courts
need deal with them unless there is sufficient evidence to submit to the jury
either that the shipowner was aware of sufficient facts to conclude that the winch
was not in proper order . ...
Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
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Moser v. Texas TrailerCorp." is instructive in regard to the first
of these requirements. In Moser, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a judgment of no liability on the part of the vessel owner for a dangerous
condition occurring in an area outside its control. The court agreed
with the trial court that the shipowner had breached no duty owed
to the plaintiff "since [the plaintiffs] injury was caused by a transitory condition of which [the shipowner] had no knowledge."" Actual
knowledge of the dangerous condition was held necessary to the existence of a continuing duty on the part of the shipowner, under the
facts presented in this particular case.'
Knowledge of the dangerous condition alone, however, will not
give rise to a continuing duty on the part of the shipowner. The
stevedore's failure to remedy the condition must also be "obviously
improvident." In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Jadranska
Slobodna Plovidba," the Seventh Circuit discussed this second prerequisite to the existence of a continuing duty on the part of the
shipowner; the opinion is very helpful in explaining what is involved
in the "obviously improvident" requirement and in determining what
must be shown in order to establish that the requirement has been
met and that a continuing duty has arisen. Referring to the Supreme
Court's characterization of the shipowner's duties in Scindia, the court
stated:
In the Court's view, the fact that the shipowner knew of the
malfunction would not in itself make him negligent; it might
be reasonable for him to rely on the stevedore's judgment that
51. 694 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1982).
52. Id. at 98.
53. The Supreme Court consistently asserted throughout the Scindia opinion that
a shipowner could have a continuing duty with respect to areas under the stevedore's
control if the shipowner actually knew of the dangerous condition. See 451 U.S. at
172. Subsequent decisions have expanded on this, however, and have suggested that
proof of actual knowledge might not always be required to give rise to a continuing
duty on the part of the shipowner. See Bueno v. United States, 687 F.2d 318, 320
(9th Cir. 1982) ("The issue [is] . . .whether, in the course of its regular inspection
activities, the shipowner should have noticed the serious danger and intervened to
correct it .... [W]hen conditions are obviously dangerous, constructive knowledge on
the part of the shipowner can be inferred, even where actual knowledge cannot be
shown."); cf. Woodruff v. United States, 710 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1983).
54. 683 F.2d 1022 (7th Cir. 1982). This case contains a very good discussion of
all of the duties imposed on shipowners under section 905(b). It should again be noted
that, absent control over or participation in cargo operations, the shipowner does not
have a general, continuing duty to supervise the activities of individual stevedoring
employees. This principle could have produced the result in United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, but the court based its decision on foreseeability.
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the winch, though defective, was safe enough .... But if the
stevedore's judgment was "so obviously improvident that [the
shipowner], if it knew of the defect and that [the stevedore]
was continuing to use it, should have realized the winch
presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the longshoremen,"
then the shipowner would have a duty to intervene and repair
the winch .... This is analogous to the common law duty of
a principal to the employees or other potential accident victims of an independent contractor.5
The court recommended but did not require that the district courts
"balanc[e] the usefulness to the ship of the dangerous condition and
the burden involved in curing it against the probability and severity
of the harm it poses,""6 when determining "whether the shipowner
should be required to backstop, as it were, the safety measures taken
by the stevedore, or whether he can rely on the stevedore to keep
the longshoremen out of harm's way"57 with respect to areas outside
the control of the shipowner. Thus, while it may not always be
reasonable for the shipowner to rely on the stevedore's judgment,
the shipowner does not necessarily have a duty to "shepherd" the
.activities of individual longshoremen with respect to areas over which
the stevedore has been given exclusive control.
'A very interesting construction was placed on this "obviously improvident" requirement by the Fourth Circuit in Gill v. Hango ShipOwners/AB,l in which the court reversed a summary judgment in favor
of the shipowner. The record in Gill disclosed that the longshoremen
had been using breakout clamps owned by the stevedoring company
to unload rolls of paper from the hatch. The accident occurred when
a clamp which had been placed on a roll of paper by the plaintiff
slipped off as the roll was being lifted and struck the plaintiff. Expert
testimony established that the rolls of paper could not have been
unloaded without the use of the breakout clamps. It was also the expert's opinion that the clamps were inherently dangerous.
The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district court's conclusion
that the plaintiffs injury was not reasonably foreseeable as a matter
of law.59 The court also noted that there was evidence that "the manner in which the cargo was stored precluded the stevedore from
55. Id. at 1025 (quoting Scindia, 451 U.S. at 175-76).
56. 683 F.2d at 1025-26 (quoting Johnson v. A/S Ivarans Rederi, 613 F.2d 334,
348 (1st Cir. 1980)).
57. 683 F.2d at 1025.
58. 682 F.2d 1070 (4th Cir. 1982).
59. Id. at 1074.
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unloading by any other means except one which was inherently
dangerous,""0 and observed that, if this were so, "this [was] not a case
in which the stevedore failed to use reasonable care but, in effect,
one in which the shipowner was the only party at fault.""1 Finally,
the court stated that even if the stevedore had also been negligent
in using the breakout clamps, liability on the part of the shipowner
was not foreclosed. Echoing the "obviously improvident" language of
Scindia, the court declared:
[I]t seems to us that the evidence is sufficient to establish a
jury issue as to whether the breakout clamp was so unsafe
that the stevedore should have ceased using it, if no alternative device was available, and, therefore, a jury issue as
to whether [the shipowner] should have intervened to stop the
loading operation until it could be done with reasonable
safety.2
CONCLUSION

In summary, negligence actions may be brought by longshoremen
against shipowners under section 905(b) for the violation of any one
of three distinct duties. The first of these is the duty of the shipowner
to exercise reasonable care to see that the ship, its equipment, and
its cargo are in a condition that will allow the stevedoring company
to perform its work safely; this duty also entails warning the stevedore
of any dangerous conditions that were either known or which should
have been known to the shipowner. A shipowner will incur liability
for violation of this duty only if the defects or dangerous conditions
causing injury existed prior to the beginning of cargo operations. The
second shipowner duty recognized under section 905(b) is the duty
to exercise reasonable care to avoid injury to longshoremen when the
vessel retains control over or participates in cargo operations. Finally,
the shipowner has a continuing duty to intervene in stevedoring operations when the shipowner has knowledge of a dangerous condition
that presents an unreasonable risk of harm to longshoremen and is
aware of an obviously improvident failure of the stevedore to rectify
it. This duty may render the shipowner liable for harm caused by
defects or dangerous conditions that develop after the beginning of
stevedoring operations, even though the defect or condition develops
in an area over which the stevedore has been given exclusive control.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1074-75.
62. Id. at 1075.
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It should be noted that all three of the Scindia duties can come
into play in one case. Ryder v. United States,3 a pre-Scindia case, provides a good example of such a situation. In Ryder, the vessel was
put into the shipyard for repairs, including repair to the steampipes,
with the ship's crew remaining aboard. Repair workers were warned
that steam would remain in some of the pipes and that they should
be cautious as to which pipes were worked on. The injury occurred
when the repair crew worked on a valve without clearance from the
ship's officers. The district court imposed liability on the shipowner
in spite of the warning that had been given. The court found from
the evidence that a duty had been imposed by custom and practice
on shipowners to provide for the safety of repair workers by the isolation, locking, and/or tagging of valves that might pose a danger. The
evidence also showed that any member of the ship's crew had authority to stop at once any work which appeared to pose a danger to
the repair workers and that members of the ship's crew were in the
area and had seen the work in progress.
It is apparent that the result in Ryder would have been obtained
by application of the duties framed by the Supreme Court in Scindia.
The vessel in Ryder discharged its initial duty to warn of the hazardous condition, but that was not its only duty. There was evidence
that custom imposed a duty on the shipowner to take further precautions and that the crew was in concurrent control of the work and
could have prevented the harm. There was also evidence of an "obviously improvident" action: namely, the removal of a valve on a live
steam line-a dangerous maneuver known to the ship's crew. The
vessel did not intervene to stop the work and remedy the dangerous
condition.
Finally, in applying the standards of Scindia to a given fact situation, plaintiff's counsel should also be mindful of the Supreme Court's
64 The
decision in Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique.
negligent shipowner remains liable for all of the losses sustained by
the injured longshoreman, even though the stevedoring company is
concurrently negligent in causing the injury. Such concurrent
negligence between shipowner and stevedore is, as a practical matter, the rule rather than the exception.
63.
64.

513 F. Supp. 551 (D. Mass. 1981).
443 U.S. 256 (1979); see also Bueno v. United States, 687 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1982).

